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Gewirth versus Kant on Kant’s Maxim of Reason: Towards a Gewirthian Philosophical 
Anthropology 
 
Introduction 
When Alan Gewirth claims that the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC)
1
 is the supreme 
principle of morality because its acceptance is dialectically necessary for agents,
2
 he assigns 
it the same status that Kant claims for his Categorical Imperative (KCI) ‒ that it is a synthetic 
a priori principle.
3
 But the PGC and KCI ‒ as Kant interprets it in his Formula of Humanity 
(FoH) 
So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means (Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals [GMM ] 4:429)
 4
 
are incompatible principles. This is because, unlike Kant’s FoH, the PGC requires an agent 
(call her ‘Agnes’) to respect (not to interfere with and, in certain circumstances, to protect) 
the generic conditions of agency (GCAs) of all agents subject to the will of the recipient 
agent. The PGC prohibits Agnes from voluntarily damaging her own GCAs or permitting 
others to so harm her only if her doing so would damage the GCAs of other agents 
disproportionately against their will; whereas Kant’s FoH categorically prohibits such actions 
unless they are necessary to protect Agnes or others from equivalent or greater harm. This 
difference
5
 is due to the fact that Gewirth’s argument for the PGC rests on it being 
dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives (PHI) 
If doing X or having X is necessary for Agnes to pursue/achieve her chosen purpose E, 
then Agnes ought to do X or pursue/defend having X, or give up E.
6
 
I argue, here, that this entails that, while Gewirth and Kant share a methodology of 
dialectically necessary argumentation, Gewirthians must reject a number of central doctrines 
of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Kant holds that the dialectical necessity of free will7 
(revealed by the dialectical necessity of the moral law, for which the existence of free will is 
a necessary condition – its ratio essendi) is the keystone that enables Agnes to be certain that 
agents are immortal and that God exists even though immortality and God are not objects of 
possible empirical knowledge.
8
 But while Gewirth and Kant agree that it is dialectically 
necessary for Agnes to treat her existence as an agent as the ratio essendi of the moral law, if 
it is dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept the PHI, then it cannot be dialectically 
necessary for her to consider the essence of agency to reside in her possession of free-will (as 
Kant has it), because it is then merely dialectically necessary for Agnes to hope
9
 that she has 
free will.
10
 Hence, my central claim is that Gewirth’s argument for the PGC implies a 
different philosophical anthropology from Kant’s grounded in Kant’s own philosophical 
methodology. 
I have presented elements of this argument elsewhere and previously compared Gewirth and 
Kant.
11
 Here, I focus the comparison on interpretation of Kant’s maxims of the common 
human understanding
12
 because I consider that what Kant says about these principles 
1 shows very clearly that his claim that KCI is a synthetic a priori proposition,
13
 i.e., 
that it is ‘connected (completely a priori) with the concept of the will of a rational 
being as such’14 but ‘not contained in it’,15 is that its acceptance is dialectically 
necessary for agents; 
2 reveals more clearly than elsewhere what his argument for this claim is; and 
3 shows how Kant thinks that the ‘power of judgment’ mediates between 
‘understanding’ and ‘reason’ so as to render possible the harmony between theoretical 
and practical reason that Kant’s view of his philosophy as a system requires.16  
The argument is in four Parts. Part I contends that Kant’s claim that ‘the maxim of reason’ is 
derived by rendering ‘the maxim of understanding’ consistent with ‘the maxim of the power 
of judgment’17 reveals that his assertion that the moral law is given to agents as the fact of 
pure reason
18
 amounts to saying that it is required on the basis of its acceptance being 
dialectical necessity for Agnes (i.e., required by agential self-understanding). The maxim of 
reason (the acceptance of which is dialectically necessary for Agnes by the very nature of its 
derivation) amounts to 
Act in accord with the dialectically necessary commitments of all agents  
which is equivalent to 
Act only on maxims when doing so is consistent with universal laws. 
Part II examines how Kant and Gewirth provide this imperative, which is surely Kant’s 
Formula of Universal Law (FUL) for KCI 
[A]ct only in accordance with that maxim which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law (GMM 4:421) 
with content. Kant claims that KCI is grounded in the proposition that rational nature exists 
as an end in itself,
19
 in consequence of which Agnes must consider her existence as an agent 
to be an end in itself.
20
 On this basis, if (as both Kant and Gewirth hold) maxims that are 
dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept are necessarily universal, it is dialectically 
necessary for Agnes to accept Kant’s FoH. In contrast, Gewirth claims that because it is 
dialectically for Agnes to accept the PHI, since there are GCAs, it is dialectically necessary 
for Agnes to accept the prescription 
 SROA:
21
 ‘I (Agnes) ought to defend my possession of the GCAs unless I am willing to 
suffer generic damage to my ability to act.’  
On this basis, given the universality of dialectically necessary maxims, the maxim of reason 
requires acceptance of the PGC. 
Part III elaborates the claim that the PGC is the categorical imperative on Kantian 
methodological premises. 
Part IV outlines the consequent revisions required to the Kantian transcendental project as a 
whole (which Kant designates as ‘anthropology’22), thereby sketching a Gewirthian 
philosophical anthropology. 
 
Part I: KCI, the Maxim of Reason and Dialectical Necessity 
Kant’s three principles of the common human understanding (sensus communis) are: 
1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think 
in accord with oneself.
23
 
The sensus communis is not what the average person considers to be reasonable or correct. It 
represents the a priori capacity of understanding ‘which is the least that can be expected from 
anyone who lays claim to the name of human being’,24 being  
[a] faculty of judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s 
way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human 
reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private 
conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence 
on the judgment.
25
 
The first maxim is the ‘maxim of the understanding, the second that of the power of 
judgment, the third that of reason’.26 The maxim of reason is achieved ‘by the combination of 
the first two’.27 The first maxim is ‘the maxim of a reason that is never passive’;28 the second 
reflects on one’s own judgments produced by acting in accord with the first maxim ‘from a 
universal standpoint’.29  
In representing general rules for the avoidance of error,
30
 the sensus communis applies to all 
reasoning, whether theoretical, practical, or aesthetic. Applied practically, the generation of 
the maxim of reason surely reveals the essence of Kant’s argument for KCI in the form of the 
FUL. 
This is because the first maxim requires Agnes to subject all maxims to the scrutiny of her 
own understanding and not to accept maxims simply on the say so of others, which requires 
her to give at least some weight to her own personal choices, deliberative reasoning, and 
associated maxims. The second maxim requires Agnes to adopt any maxims required by 
virtue of understanding that she is an agent. Thus, it exhorts Agnes to adopt maxims that are 
dialectically necessary for her to accept, the requirements of agential self-understanding. The 
third maxim commands Agnes to act only in consistency with maxims that are dialectically 
necessary for her to accept. 
I think that Kant, like internalists generally, reasons that for Agnes to be given a reason to act 
she must be given a reason to act from the standpoint of the particular unique agent she is. 
However, unlike Humean internalists, he infers from the observation that exercise of the 
power of reflective judgment requires Agnes to recognize that she cannot be the particular 
agent she is unless she is an agent (i.e., unless she possesses the powers of understanding 
necessarily shared by all agents) that for Agnes to think that she has a personal understanding 
to oppose the personal understandings of others, she must reason in terms of any maxims she 
is required to accept simply by virtue of understanding what it is for her to be an agent. Since 
requirements that are dialectically for Agnes to accept are generated by the idea of being an 
agent, and being an agent is the same for all agents, any maxim that is dialectically necessary 
for Agnes to accept will be dialectically necessary for every agent to accept. Hence maxims 
that are dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept are universal. Understanding this, 
consistency requires Agnes to accept the third maxim, to act in consistency with maxims that 
are dialectically necessary for any agent to accept, as itself a maxim that it is dialectically 
necessary for her to accept. As such, reason requires her to adopt the third maxim as the 
supreme criterion for rational action, which she cannot intelligibly do without treating it as a 
categorical imperative expressed in terms of the FUL read as 
Act only on maxims that you can act on consistently with universal laws (i.e., 
consistently with maxims that are dialectically necessary for any agent to accept).  
Kant’s reasoning may also be put as follows. By virtue of being an agent, Agnes possesses 
the powers of self-understanding. If she uses these powers to achieve agential self-
understanding then she will necessarily be presented with the concept of a categorical 
imperative (i.e., it is dialectically necessary for Agnes to entertain the idea of a categorical 
imperative). But a categorical imperative, by its very meaning, is an imperative that all her 
maxims must be consistent with, which entails that she must accept a categorical imperative, 
‘Act only on maxims that are consistent with a categorical imperative’, which is equivalent to 
‘Act only on maxims that you can act on consistently with maxims that are dialectically 
necessary for you to accept’. Therefore, it is dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept the 
FUL. 
In essence, Kant’s argument is: It is dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept that the 
criterion for a permissible maxim is one that is consistent with a categorical imperative. To 
understand this, however, is to recognize that the FUL is a categorical imperative. Therefore, 
it is dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept that the FUL is a categorical imperative. 
There is much debate on what Kant’s argument for KCI is and dispute over whether or not he 
changed his mind about this between his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GMM) 
and Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR). I believe that Kant’s justification for the moral law 
in GMM III and for his contention in CPrR that the moral law is given to us as the fact of 
pure reason
31
 both involve the reasoning for the FUL just sketched. Although I cannot justify 
this claim fully here,
32
 I will indicate briefly how CPrR and GMM can be linked to the maxim 
of reason of Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPoJ) in this way. 
In CPrR, after telling us that we become conscious of the moral law as soon as we draw up 
maxims for ourselves,
33
 and that pure reason leads us from consciousness of the moral law to 
the concept of free will,
34
 Kant asks, ‘But how is consciousness of that moral law possible?’ 
and answers: 
We can become aware of pure practical laws just as we are aware of pure theoretical 
principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and to 
the setting aside of all empirical conditions to which reason directs us. The concept of a 
pure will arises from the first, as consciousness of a pure understanding arises from the 
latter.
35
 
The key parallel statements in GMM are that 
a human being really finds in himself a capacity by which he distinguishes himself … 
even from himself insofar as he is affected by objects, and that is reason
36
  
and that by thinking of oneself 
as an intelligence, that is, as independent of sensible impressions in the use of reason 
(hence as belonging to the world of understanding) … 
 … [the human being perceives] that pure reason independent of sensibility gives the 
[moral] law.
37
  
These statements are not wholly transparent, but I contend that they should be interpreted as 
making the same claim because (i) it is possible to do so and Kant says
38
 that CPrR 
presupposes GMM on the justification of the moral law; (ii) the process they refer to is 
plausibly that involved in generating the maxim of reason by rendering the maxim of 
understanding consistent with the maxim of the power of judgment;
39
 and (iii) the three 
maxims of the sensus communis appear as fundamental principles of Kant’s philosophy 
before GMM (in Logic) and after CPrR (in CPoJ).  
 
Part II: Kant vs Gewirth on the Content of the Moral Law 
Whether or not I am right about this, I consider that it is in fact dialectically necessary for 
agents to accept the FUL on the basis that it is derived by rendering the maxim of 
understanding and the maxim of the power of judgment consistent with each other, and that 
this renders the FUL a categorical imperative. 
I anticipate three objections to this. 
(1) Even if it is categorically imperative for agents to accept dialectically necessary 
maxims, these are not intrinsically universal. 
(2)  Even if it is dialectical necessary to accept the FUL, this does not make it 
categorically binding, because Agnes will not necessarily care whether or not she 
complies with the requirements of agential self-understanding. 
(3)  Even if the first two objections can be met, the FUL lacks content. 
In essence, my response to objection (1) is that if the ratio cognoscendi for Agnes to accept 
any normative claim is that its acceptance is dialectical necessity for her, then it is 
dialectically necessary for Agnes to regard being an agent as the ratio essendi for the 
assertoric validity of the claim, which renders it dialectically necessary for Agnes to treat the 
dialectically necessary commitments of all agents as assertorically valid, which renders them 
universal.
40
 
Objection (2) is presented by, e.g., David Enoch.
41
 My short response is that Enoch 
mistakenly presents Kant and Gewirth as maintaining that normative claims are derived from 
what constitutes being an agent, whereas grounding them in dialectical necessary acceptance 
constitutes the requirement to accept them as one of agential self-understanding. On the latter 
basis, if Agnes attaches no practical significance to the FUL being dialectically necessary for 
her to accept, this merely means that she does not care that she categorically ought to act 
according to the FUL (which circumstance must be possible for it to be intelligible to say that 
she ought to comply with the FUL). 
Although more needs to be said about objections (1) and (2), I will confine my attention here 
to how Kant and Gewirth deal with objection (3), because it is only on this and not on how to 
respond to objections (1) and (2) that I consider them to differ significantly. 
 
Kant’s Derivation of the FoH 
Kant says that the ground of KCI is ‘rational nature exists as an end in itself’.42 He surely 
means that to act rationally (i.e., in accord with the maxim of reason, in consistency with a 
maxim that it is dialectically necessary for an agent to accept, i.e., in accord with the FUL) is 
an end in itself. He then says that the ‘human being necessarily represents his own existence 
in this way [i.e., as an end in itself]’.43 Because he argues that every rational being (human or 
not) must, on the basis of having to consider that it is an end in itself, consider that the ratio 
essendi for its being an end in itself is its possession of free will (which means that he claims 
that it is dialectically necessary for Agnes to consider that the essence of agency resides in the 
possession of free will), he maintains that the FoH is a formula for KCI.
44
  
But why must Agnes regard her existence as an end in itself? 
Kant says that it follows from the FUL that the existence of every rational being must be ‘the 
limiting condition of all relative and arbitrary ends’45 because the FUL requires 
that in the use of means to any end I am to limit my maxim to the condition of its 
universal validity for every subject [which] is tantamount to saying that the subject of 
ends, the rational being itself, must be made the basis of all maxims for action, never 
merely as a means but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means, that is, 
always at the same time as an end.
46
 
There is a way of interpreting this is consistent with the Gewirthian perspective (see Part III). 
But Kant claims that the FoH, unlike the PGC, prescribes that 
I cannot … dispose of a human being in my own person by maiming, damaging or 
killing him
47
  
which statement Kant  immediately qualifies by alluding to specific exceptions to save one’s 
own life or the life of another that are more fully dealt with in his Metaphysics of Morals 
(MoM). If we interpret ‘maiming, damaging, or killing’ an agent as interfering with the 
agent’s GCAs then, in Gewirthian terms, KCI amounts to 
So act that you never interfere with the GCAs of any agent for any relative or arbitrary 
ends (i.e., as means to your chosen ends) unless to protect the GCAs of an agent. 
In this way, Kant’s FoH provides the maxim of reason with a content or ‘matter’.48 
 
Gewirth’s Derivation of the PGC 
Assuming that dialectically necessary commitments are categorically binding, if the 
following three propositions are true, then the PGC is the categorical imperative. 
1  It is dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept the PHI. 
2  There are GCAs. 
3  Maxims that are dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept are universal. 
The demonstration of this is as follows. 
1 coupled with 2 entails 
4  It is dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept ‘SROA: “I (Agnes) ought to defend 
my possession of the GCAs unless I (Agnes) am willing to suffer generic damage to 
my ability to act”’ as a standard for her action. 
3 coupled with 4 entails both 
5 It is dialectically necessary for any other agent (say, Brian) to accept ‘SROB: “I 
(Brian) ought to defend my possession of the GCAs unless I (Brian) am willing to 
suffer generic damage to my ability to act”’ as a standard for his action 
and 
6 It is dialectically necessary for Agnes to accept SROB (as well as SROA) as a 
standard for her action, and dialectically necessary for Brian to accept SROA (as well 
as SROB) as a standard for his action. 
And 6 is equivalent to ‘It is dialectically necessary for all agents to accept the PGC’. 
 
Part III: The PGC is the Moral Law on Kantian Methodological Premises 
Because the PGC is the universalization of SROA (the PHI given content by the GCAs), it 
does not prohibit Agnes from ‘maiming, damaging, or killing’ herself, if she does so 
voluntarily and by so doing does not disproportionately threaten or damage the GCAs of 
other agents against their will. Thus, if Agnes’s humanity consists of her material existence as 
an agent then the PGC does not require Agnes to treat her own humanity as an end in itself. It 
permits, indeed, requires her (ceteris paribus) to treat her own humanity as a means to her 
own voluntarily chosen ends. On the other hand, if to respect her own humanity is to respect 
herself as a chooser of ends, then, while she may not treat the humanity of others merely as a 
means, it makes no sense to say that she may not treat her own humanity merely as a means 
because it is impossible for her in acting to treat her own humanity merely as a means. If in 
treating herself as a means she is acting, she voluntarily treats herself as a means, so treats 
herself as an end as well as a means.  
Furthermore, if acceptance of the PHI is dialectically necessary for Agnes, then it is a 
categorical imperative on Kant’s view about the nature of such an imperative.49  But Kant 
recognizes that there can be only one categorical imperative.
50
 Consequently, all formulae for 
the categorical imperative must be consistent with each other and with the PHI. Therefore, 
Kant’s FoH cannot be a formula for KCI. Christine Korsgaard51 cannot be right that the PHI 
is merely that aspect of KCI that tells us how to be effective agents. The dialectical necessity 
of acceptance of the PHI necessarily affects the content of KCI, because no formula for KCI 
can then be incompatible with the universalization of SROA, which (prior to 
universalization) only requires Agnes to defend her existence as an agent if she is unwilling to 
suffer generic damage to her ability to act. Gewirthians can agree that it is dialectically 
necessary for Agnes to make being an agent the supreme limiting condition in the use of all 
means, but only if this signifies that Agnes must regard being an agent as the ratio essendi for 
her (and others’) dialectically necessary commitments. Any further inference depends on 
what her dialectically necessary commitments are, and given that the dialectical necessity of 
acceptance of the PHI entails that her dialectically necessary commitment is to SROA, not to 
‘Agnes ought to defend her GCAs whether or not she is willing to suffer generic damage to 
her ability to act’ (as Kant maintains), making being an agent the supreme limiting condition 
in the use of all means requires Agnes to grant every agent a prima facie right to determine 
what may be done with the agent’s own GCAs. It does not require Agnes to recognize any 
perfect duty to herself to defend her material existence as an agent. 
 
Part IV: Gewirthian Revisions to the Kantian Transcendental Project 
However, the dialectical necessity of acceptance of the PHI does not merely require KCI/the 
FUL to be interpreted in accordance with the PGC rather than Kant’s FoH: it requires 
rejection of the following inter-linked Kantian doctrines. 
A. The moral law is a law of nature for a being with free will unaffected by heteronomous 
incentives, and an imperative only for beings with free will affected by heteronomous 
incentives
52
 ‒ which implies that KCI cannot apply to all rational beings with a will. 
B. The aspect of self-understanding by which Agnes distinguishes herself from herself 
insofar as she is affected by heteronomous incentives (per CPoJ, the reflective power of 
judgment), reveals her ‘proper’ self as against merely ‘the appearance’ of herself.53 
C. Agnes’s ‘proper’ self, ‘homo noumenon’, gives the moral law to her human self – the mere 
appearance of herself – ‘homo phaenomenon’.54  
D. An agent per se is homo noumenon, a being having free will unaffected by heteronomous 
incentives (implying that the maxim of understanding and the maxim of the power of 
judgment are rendered consistent with each other by subordinating the former to the latter). 
E. The moral law and free will are reciprocal
55
 in that the dialectical necessity of acceptance 
of the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi for free will correlative to free will being the ratio 
essendi of the moral law.
56
 
F. The dialectical necessity of acceptance of free will renders acceptance of God’s existence 
and the immortality of agents dialectically necessary.
57
  
The narrative connecting these propositions runs something like this. In thinking that 
empirical knowledge is possible Agnes presupposes that every event has a cause;
58
 but she 
must also believe that her will is free because her possession of free will is necessary for her 
to be bound by the moral law.
59
 If agents have free will then they are responsible for their 
actions
60
 so ought to receive happiness in proportion to the degree to which they act out of 
respect for the moral law (which realized state of affairs is the summum bonum). But for the 
summum bonum to be possible, for agents to be able to hope that the summum bonum will be 
realized, they must be immortal and God must exist. Therefore, the dialectical necessity of 
acceptance of free will renders belief (faith) in God and immortality dialectically necessary.
61
 
While actions cannot be products of free will and natural causes in the same aspect,
62
 this 
yields no contradiction because what Agnes does is only an event subject to the law of nature 
insofar as it is an object of sense experience, while anything she does as an exercise of her 
free will is not such an event.
63
 While Agnes’s perception that she is part of a world that she 
can know through sense-experience threatens the idea that she has any significance as an end 
in herself by positing her extinction and an ultimately purposeless cosmos, being subject to 
the moral law promises that she has such significance by positing her immortality and God’s 
existence.
64
 But this threat and this promise do not carry equal weight. Pure practical reason 
takes priority over pure theoretical reason
65
 because the maxim of reason requires Agnes to 
subordinate herself as homo phaenomenon to herself as homo noumenon. Consequently, 
Agnes ought to be certain that God exists and that her continued existence does not depend 
on her material existence. 
This narrative, quite apart from considerations to do with the dialectical necessity of 
acceptance of the PHI, is extremely problematic. For example, it is questionable that 
adherence to a categorical imperative requires Agnes to believe that she has free will as 
against merely not believing that she does not;
66
 and also questionable that postulation by the 
moral law of the summum bonum and hope that all agents will enjoy happiness in proportion 
to their virtue requires belief that God exists and that agents are immortal, as against merely 
not believing that God does not exist, etc., and hoping that God exists, etc.
67
 The existence of 
a categorical imperative does, I think, postulate that agents ought to enjoy happiness in 
proportion to their virtue. But the fact that they will not necessarily be able to enjoy such 
happiness unless God exists, etc., only requires belief that God ought to exist, which requires 
no more than leaving it open that God might exist. And, conversely, the existence of an 
omnipotent wholly good God (the only being that Kant will recognize as God), surely implies 
that agents necessarily will enjoy happiness in proportion to their virtue, and not merely that 
they might enjoy such happiness, so it is untenable to assign a different epistemic status to the 
summum bonum from that accorded to the existence of free will, immortality, and God.
68
  
Furthermore, can the moral law really apply to beings with free will unaffected by 
heteronomous incentives as a natural law and to those who are affected by such incentives as 
a categorical imperative? There are several problems here. For example, if immortality is 
postulated by the moral law through free will then there is no sense in an imperative that 
prohibits self-destruction, for self-destruction must be thought to be impossible. It is also 
difficult to see how a law that governs beings constituted in abstraction from heteronomy can 
be a law of non-natural causality of the behaviour of heteronomously constituted beings. As 
Bernard Williams says, one cannot be a rational agent and no more.
69
 So, while Agnes cannot 
be the particular agent that she is without being an agent ‒ which I do not think Williams 
takes adequate account of
70
 ‒ she also (as Williams insists) cannot be an agent without being 
the particular agent she is, and she cannot be a particular agent without possessing 
heteronomous properties. Therefore, Kant has difficulty explaining how the ideas of free will 
and natural causality can apply to the same being. Also, according to Kant, free will is 
postulated by pure practical reason (the maxim of reason, the faculty of desire). But having 
homo noumenon give the law to homo phaenomenon renders free will essentially a postulate 
of the reflective power of judgment, and only derivatively one of practical reason. This is 
because negative freedom (absence of heteronomy) is postulated by the power of judgment, 
while positive freedom (viewed as the ratio essendi for the moral law qua a law of nature for 
non-heteronomously affected beings) is generated purely by consistency with negative 
freedom.  
Anyway, the dialectical necessity of acceptance of the PHI renders Kant’s picture incoherent 
because it entails that a normatively meaningful abstraction from Agnes’s particular self 
cannot be a conceptual construct that depicts being an agent as something free of all 
heteronomous qualities. This implies that 
(a) the moral law can exist only in the form of a categorical imperative; 
(b) the maxim of reason is a synthesis of the maxim of understanding and the maxim of the 
power of judgment. Agential self-understanding requires the unity of theoretical and practical 
reason, not the priority of practical reason over theoretical reason,
71
 unless such priority 
signifies merely that all a priori rules of understanding/judgment/reason are ultimately rules 
of agential self-understanding. However, because Agnes cannot be free and determined in the 
same aspect, unity between theoretical and practical reason can only be achieved by 
suspension of belief in both free will and determinism. Consequently Agnes may and must 
entertain only the possibility that she has free will; 
(c) being an agent, the ratio essendi for the moral law is not having free will in abstraction 
from having heteronomous incentives, but combining in one’s person the heteronomous 
incentives one has as a particular agent in a particular context with the universal power for 
choice inherent in all agents. Agnes’s agency as the ratio essendi for the PGC is a universal 
relation not a universal property, the relation between Agnes’s heteronomy and her 
possession of the power of choice, which is the same relation as that between Brian’s 
heteronomy and his possession of the power of choice; 
(d) because the same epistemic status must be given to all the ideas linked to the idea of free 
will, agents may (and must) only hope that God exists and that they are immortal. 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy is premised, I think correctly, on the view that Agnes 
cannot know with certainty that there is a world that exists independently of her senses, only 
that if there is such a world then every sensible event must have a cause. That she is 
presented with the idea of a world that exists independently of her senses at all derives from 
her experience that she is not able to predict or will all her experience, and in this experience 
she views herself as something independent of what she experiences. However, as Fichte 
maintains,
72
 the ideas of I and not-I are inseparable in this experience. Agnes cannot think of 
herself as a distinct individual without having the idea of something that is not herself and 
vice versa. Furthermore, self-reflection also tells her that she cannot be certain that there is 
anything at all beyond her experience, and the existence of an external world cannot be 
assessed in probabilistic terms either. Consequently, her powers of pure self-understanding 
alone cannot secure anything epistemically beyond what is involved in understanding self-
understanding.
73
 So, Agnes can ascribe certainty only to what she must believe in order for 
self-understanding to be possible for her, which is no more than what she must accept in 
order to be able to ask questions, to have ideas, etc. Consequently, pure reason places her 
inescapably in a state of hoping/fearing in relation to all metaphysical matters. 
As such, Kant’s philosophy is neither a form of metaphysical idealism nor a form of 
metaphysical realism, but a ‘transcendental phenomenology’74 that requires dubiety on all 
metaphysical matters and confines theoretical certainties to rules governing the operation of 
the intelligent mind. But, I contend, it is Gewirth, not Kant, who works this out correctly in 
relation to practical reason. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The Gewirthian anthropology I have presented is merely a sketch, and some will question my 
characterization of Kant’s position. However, if the PHI is dialectically necessary and 
dialectically necessary commitments are universal, then Kantians as well as Gewirthians must 
accept that the PGC is the supreme principle of practical reason and ought to adopt the 
philosophical anthropology that this entails.
75
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